CPLR Article 78 Response - FUSL000027 (2016-02-10) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
CPLR Article 78 Responses Court Litigation Documents 
September 2019 
CPLR Article 78 Response - FUSL000027 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/art78_response 
Recommended Citation 
"CPLR Article 78 Response - FUSL000027 2016-02-10" (2019). Parole Information Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/art78_response/2 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Court Litigation Documents at FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in CPLR Article 78 Responses 
by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more 
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK COUNTY 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- )( 
In the Matter of 
Petitioner, 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 nf thc 
Civil Practice Law and Rules, 
- against -
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT Of 
CORRECTIONS AN D COMMUNITY SU PERVISION; 
ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, ACTING COMMISSIONER; 
and TINA M. STANFORD, CI fAlR WOMAN OF THE 






Respondents, the New York State Department o f Corrections and Community 
Supervision ("OOCCS"); Anthony J. /\nnucci, the Acting Commissioner or DOCCS; and Tina 
M. Stanford , Chairwoman of the New York State Board of Parole (the "Board''), by their 
a ttorney, ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General of the State of' New York, answer the 
Petition, dated December 11 , 20 15, as follows: 
l. Deny upon information and belief every material allegation contained m the 
Petition except as admitted herein. 
2. The Board is a part of DOC CS. 1 The Board, consisting of' up to nineteen ( 19) 
members appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate for six-year terms, is tasked 
primarily with deciding which inmates should be granted discretionary release to the community 
along with imposing any condi tions of release. 
1 DOCCS is a result of the merger of the New York State Department of Correcti on Services and 
the Division of Parole in March 31, 20 11. The Board of Parole was part of the Di vision of 
Parole. 
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3. Petitioner, , 1s m the care and custody of 
DOCCS and is an inmate at Albion Correctional Facility. 
PETITIONER'S CRIMINALITY 
4 . On August 31, l 996, Petitioner' was found dead 
in a crib in Petitioner's home. At the time of her death weighed fifteen and a half 
pounds, the average weight of a six month old. In the months before her death,- was 
confined to the crib and hidden away from family members, neighbors, friends, school otlicials 
and the Administration for Children Services. See Pre-Sentence Report submitted for in camera 
review, attached as Exh. A; see also Pet. Exh. 25 (sentencing minutes), at 3:26 - 5:22. 
5. On October 24, 1997, Petitioner pied guilty and was sentenced to fifteen years to 
life for murder in the second degree. See Sentence & Order of Commitment, attached as Exh. B. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
6. Petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for a video interview on April 27, 
20 l 5. See Transcript of Board Interview ("Transcript"), attached as Exh. C. The April 27, 20 l 5, 
interview was Petitioner's third; she had previously been denied parole in 2011 and 2013. See 
Pet. at p. 46.2 
7. As preparation for her interview, attorneys from Lincoln Square Legal Services 
Inc. helped Petitioner obtain and prepare documents for submission to the Parole Board. See Pet. 
at p. 32; Exh. 2 l to Pet. 
8. During the interview, the Board asked Petitioner about the underlying crime. 
Transcript at 4: 17 - 7:8. 
2 Citations to "Pet." refer to pages or exhibits in the Petition. 
2 
FUSL000027 
9. The l3oard asked Petitioner abou t her rehabili tative e ffo rts, specitically what 
programs she participated in while incarcerated and how those programs influenced her. f <l. at 
8:4-9: 15. The Board specifically asked Petitioner to discuss the program that was most 
significant for her. hl:. at 9:2-15. 
I 0. The Uoard informed Petitioner that it would consider the packet of documents she 
submitted . hl:. at 2: I 7-20. The Board specifically asked Petitioner ·'[ils there anything else from 
this packet that you particularly would like to highlight fo r us?" Id. at 9: 16- 17. Petitioner 
replied, '·No ma 'am. It's self-explanatory." 
I I. The Board also asked Petitioner about her prospective plans, if released. 
specifically the deportation order to - where she intended to live, and her employment 
prospects. Id . at 9: 19- 10:24. 
12. At the conclusion of her interview, Peti tioner was denied release to parole. !fl at 
12: 1-1 3:8; see also Parole Board Release Decision Notice, attached as Exh. D. In denying 
Petitioner's release, the Board considered the relevant statutory factors, including Petitioner's 
risk to society, rehabilitation efforts, and her needs for successful reentry into the community. 
Id. at 12: 13-18. 
13. Petitioner, through her attorneys, appealed the Board's decision on May 19, 2015. 
Pet. at p. 7. The Appeals Unit of the Parole Board received Petitioner's brief in support of the 
appeal on July 2, 20 15. See Administrative Appeal Brief, attached as Exh. E. 
14. The Appeals Unit affirmed the Board's decision on September 24, 2015. See 
Appeals Un it Decision, attached as Exh. F. 
15. Petitioner thereafter commenced this Article 78 proceeding seeking an order 





FIRST 08,JECTION lN POINT OF LAW 
MANY OF PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS 
HA VE NOT BEEN PRESERVED FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
'·[Ilt is well settled that an argument not raised for the time before the 
430 (2009) 
( citations omitted). A court is ''limited in a CPLR article 78 nrn,f'Pf>ft to reviewing ' 
actually raised before the administrative agency making the determination."' Matter of Erdheim 
~=~, 7 A.D.3d 876, 877 (3d Dep't. 2004) (quoting Matter of Roggemann v. Bane, 223 
A.D.2d 854, 856 (3d Dep't. 1996)). Thus, any issues raised by a petitioner in an Article 78 
proceeding which were not raised before the administrative agency are not preserved for judicial 
review. Matter of Hernandez v. Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 819 (3d Dep't. 2009) (matter not 
raised before the Board on administrative appeal not preserved for Article 78 review); Matter of 
Shapard v. Zon, 30 A.D.3d 1098 (4th Dep't. 2006) (same). 
A. Objections Not Made to the Parole Board Have Been \Vaived. 
17. Any issues now raised by Petitioner which could have been addressed during her 
interview, including, but not limited to, any alleged errors in any DOCCS or other records, but 
were not raised at the parole interview, have been waived. See Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 
A.D.2d 797 (3d Dep't. 2000); Matter of Flores v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 210 A.D.2d 555 
(3d Dep't. 1994); Matter of Morel v. Travis, 278 A.D.2d 580 (3d Dep't. 2000), Iv. denied, 96 
N. Y.2d 752 (200 l ). 
18. In this Article 78 proceeding, Petitioner claims, inter alia, that: the Board did not 
provide her a complete interview because it did not let her read her personal statement (Pet. at p. 
43 ); the Board failed to consider her sentencing minutes (id. at p. 44); and there are errors in her 





but did not do so. Therefore, these arguments have not been 
8. Matters Not Raised before the Appeals Unit Have Not Been Preserved. 
19. part of her administrative appeal of the Parole Board's denial of parole, 
Petitioner-through the same attorneys who represent her here-submitted a brief. Exh. E. 
Therein, Petitioner argued that: (I) the Board failed to provide Petitioner with a complete interview 
because it did not let her read her personal statement; (2) the Board stated that it did not have the 
sentencing minutes, but Petitioner was able to obtain the minutes from DOCCS prior to the 
interview; (3) the Board relied upon an "OMH report" in Petitioner's parole file, which was not 
provided in response to Petitioner's request; (4) the Board unlawfully withheld or redacted portions 
of Petitioner's parole file; (5) the COMP AS assessment contained erroneous information; (6) the 
Board failed to provide detailed reasons for its deeision; and (7) the Board's decision was arbitrary 
and capricious because it did not consider statements from the victim's representatives. Id. 
20. As discussed above, Petitioner waived certain objections by not raising them during 
her parole interview, including any alleged issues with the documents considered by the Board. 
Thus, those issues were not preserved for review by the Appeals Unit on administrative appeal, or 
the Court in this Article 78 proceeding. 
21. In addition, many of the arguments in the Petition were not raised before the 
Appeals Unit. These arguments include, inter alia: 
• Petitioner's mental health and substance abuse issues were integrally intertwined with 
her crime, yet the Board did not give her current mental health and sobriety the 
consideration it was due (Pet. at pp. 32-35); 
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• The 13oard was required to consider DOCCS' recommendati ons regarding 
deportation but did not do so (Pet. at p. 36); 
• The Board's decision that release was incompatible with the welfare of society is 
inconsistent with Petitioner's proactively seeking therapeutic programs and 
opportunities for rehabilitation above and beyond the programs DOCCS offers (Pet. 
at 37); 
• The Board's conclusion that Ms.- poses a risk to community safety is 
inconsistent with her educational accomplishments (Pet. at pp. 38-40); 
• The Board's conclusion that release was incompatible with the welfare of society is 
inconsistent with Petitioner's submission of comprehensive post-release plans (Pet. at 
pp. 40-41). 
Accordingly, these issues have also not been properly preserved for judicial review. 
SECOND OBJECTION IN POINT OF LAW 
THE PAROLE BOARD'S DETERMINATION 
NOT TO RELEASE PETITIONER ON PAROLE 
WAS MADE INACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW 
AND WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
OR IMPERMISSIBL Y CONCLUSORY 
A. The Parole Board Considered AH Relevant Statutory Factors and Based Its Decision 
on Permissible Factors 
22. [tis well established that the Board's release decisions are discretionary. So long 
as the Board's discretion is exercised in keeping with statutory requirements, its decisions are not 
s ubject to judicial review. See Matter of Saunders v. Travis, 238 A.D.2d 688 (3d Dep' t 1997); 
People ex ~el. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 131 (1st Oep't 1983). 
As the Court of Appeals has explained, " [t)o require the [Board] to act m 
accordance with judicial expectations ... would substantially undermine the [legislative] 
6 
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to entrust to the [ Board I and not the courts." 
( 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
A the to cannot be disturbed in the absence 
of a convincing demonstration by Petitioner that it was affected by irrationality bordering on 
impropriety. 
69 ( 1980); see 
~~'" 277 A.D.2d 576 (3d Dep't 2000). A showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety is 
a high bar for a party to surmount. 
Dep't 2007) ("In order to set aside a determination of the Parole Board, the Petitioner bears the 
heavy burden of establishing that the determination was the result of irrationality bordering on 
1997). 
25. According to Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i)-(viii), when determining whether 
an inmate should be released on parole after the minimum period of imprisonment imposed by 
the sentencing court, the Board must consider: 
(i) the institutional record including program goals and 
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, 
training or work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff 
and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a participant in a 
temporary release program; (iii) release plans including 
community resources, employment, education and training and 
support services available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order 
issued by the federal government against the inmate while in the 
custody of the department and any recommendation regarding 
deportation made by the commissioner of the department pursuant 
to [Corr. Law § 147]; (v) any statement made to the board by the 
crime victim ·or the victim's representative, where the crime victim 
is deceased or is mentally or physically incapacitated; (vi) the 
length of the determinate sentence to which the inmate would be 
subject had he or she received a sentence pursuant to section 70. 70 
or section 70.71 of the penal law for a felony defined in article two 
7 
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two hundred twenty-one of the penal 
of the offense with due consideration to 
length of sentence and recommendations of 
district attorney, the attorney for the 
probation report as well as consideration 
and aggravating factors, and activities following 
arrest prior to confinement; and ( viii) prior criminal record, 
including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any 
previous probation or parole supervision and institutional 
confinement. 
Law 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i)-(viii); see Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d 470 at 476-77. 
26. The statute also provides that "[d]iscretionary release on parole shall not be 
granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined, 
but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with 
the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine 
respect for law." Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); see also Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 
360 (1st Dep't 1998). 
27. Contrary to Petitioner's claim (See Pet. at pp. 30-41 ), the Board clearly 
considered all the relevant statutory factors during the parole interview. First, in satisfaction of 
Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii), which focuses on the seriousness of the offense, the Board 
discussed the murder and its surrounding circumstances. Transcript at 3:21-7:8. Before moving 
on, the Board also gave Petitioner an opportunity to further discuss the crime and sentence. Id. at 
7:9-11. 
28. ln satisfaction of Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i), which looks at the inmate's 
institutional record, the Board then ·asked Petitioner about her rehabilitative efforts, specifically 
asking her about what programs she participated in while incarcerated. Id. at 7:12-8:19, 9:2-17. 
The Board specifically noted its receipt and consideration of letters regarding Petitioner's 
8 
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psychiatric status. fd. at 8-20-2 1. The Board also discussed Petitioner's institutional history (id. 
at 8: 11-19) and disciplinary record (id. at 8:22-25). 
29. The Board acknowledged receipt of documents submitted on Petitioner's behalf, 
and informed Petitioner that the submissions would be considered. Id. at 2: 17-20. The Board 
specifically asked Petitioner if there was anything particular in her submissions that she wished 
to " highlight." 1.d. at 9: 16-17. Petitioner declined, stating that " It's self-explanatory." Id. at 
9: 18. 
30. In satisfaction of Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(iii), which looks to the inmate's 
release plans, the Board asked Petitioner about where she intends to live and post-release plans. 
ld. at 9: 19- I 0:24. 
3 1. In satisfaction of Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(iv), which concerns any 
deportation order issued by the federal government, the Board asked about Petitioner' s plans if 
she were to be released and deported t fd. at 9:19- 10: 17. 
32. The Board also asked Petitioner about her prior drug use (id. at 3:21-4:4), and her 
mental health (id. at 4: I 0-1 6). Those factors are relevant to her rehabilitative efforts and release 
plan. 
33. The Board also noted for the record that it had reviewed the COMPAS Risk 
Assessment, wh ich is relevant to Petitioner's rehabilitative effort. Id. at 3: 13-4:9. 
34. Even if Peti tioner's claim that the Board did not consider all the relevant statutory 
factors is tme, which it is not, the case Jaw is clear that the failure to discuss all of the relevant 
factors at the interview does not provide a basis for upsetting the Board's decision. See Matter of 
Morales v. Travis, 260 A.D.2d 71 0 (3d Dep't. 1999); Matter of Waters v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 252 A.D.2d 759 (3d Dep' t. 1998); Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 
9 
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41 ==~~=~~~=-~=-"'=~=:-=-~=' 91 A.D.2d 
told Petitioner that it considered the statutory n,,..,,",." 
is a would 
welfare ""'''"''" and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime 
12. 
Although each factor must be considered, the Board is not required to discuss 
each factor during the interview, see Matter of Griffin v. Dennison, 32 A.0.3d 1060, 1061 (3d 
Dep't. 2006), or mention each of the requisite factors in its decision. Matter of Nicoletta v. 
~=-~~=~~'--=~===, 74 A.0.3d 1609, 1609 (3d Dep't 2010). Rather, the Board is 
free to mention only ''the most compelling factors influencing its decision, [ and is] under no 
obligation to discuss every factor it considered." Matter of Angel v. Travis, I A.0.3d 859, 860 
(3d Dep't. 2003). 
36. When an inmate challenges a decision of the Board that denied him or her parole, 
the court's role not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, 
but only whether the Board followed the [statute] and rendered a determination that is supported, 
and not contradicted, by the facts in the record." Matter of Comfort v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 68 A.0.3d 1295, 1296 (3d Dep't. 2009). 
37. Moreover, in the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not 
consider the statutory factors set out under Executive Law § 259-i, it must be presumed that the 
Board fulfilled its duty. See Herbert, 97 A.0.2d 128 at 133. 
38. Parole release is a discretionary function of the Board, and Petitioner has not met 
her burden of demonstrating that the Board abused its discretion in denying her release, or that 




determining will and who will remain in prison, a petitioner who to obtain 
judicial on the grounds that the Board did not properly consider all of 
or that an improper factor was considered, a heavy burden. 
39. The Board is permitted to consider the brutality and depravity of the offense and 
the inmate's disregard for the life of another human being. Matter of Dudley v. Travis, 227 
A.D.2d 863 (3d Dep't. 1996); Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821 (3d Dep't. 2003). It is 
within the Board's discretion to conclude that the violent nature of the crime is an overriding 
consideration warranting the denial of parole release. Rodeney v. Dennison, 24 AD.3d 
1152 (3d Dep't. 2005). The Board does not need to refer to each and every one of the requisite 
factors in its decision or give them equal weight. See Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 
105 (1st Dep't. 2008); Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD. 2d 423 (1st 
Dep't. 1993), aff'd, 83 N.Y. 2d 788 (1994); Matter of Blasich v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 48 
AD. 3d 1029 (3d Dep't. 2008); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Div. of Parole, 30 AD.3d 
746 (3d Dep't. 2006); Matter of De Lagarde v. New York State Div. of Parole, 23 AD.3d 876 (3d 
Dep't. 2005); Matter of Legette v. Travis, 11 AD.3d 849 (3d Dep't. 2004); Matter of Mata v. 
Travis, 8 AD.3d 570 (2d Dep't. 2004); Matter of Ek v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 307 AD.2d 
433 (3d Dep't. 2003). Accordingly, the Board's emphasis on the violent nature of the crime does 
not establish irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Matter of Pulliam v. Dennison, 38 AD.3d 
963 (3d Dep't. 2007); Matter of Sterling v. Dennison, 38 AD.3d 1145 (3d Dep't. 2007) ("The 
Board was not required to give each factor equal weight and co_uld, as it did, choose to place greater 





N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 








~=-~'"-==' 111 A.D.2d 839 (2d Dep't 1985); =~~=~~==~, 99 A.D.2d 546, 
471 N.Y.S.2d 630 (2d Dep't 1984); 93 A.D.2d 958 (3d Dep't 
1983). 
41. Furthermore, while the Board is statutorily required to consider criteria relevant to 
the individual inmate, the Court of Appeals has held that the "Board need not expressly discuss 
each of these guidelines in its determination." Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of 
~=, 119 A.D.3d 1268 (3d Dep't. 2014) (quoting Matter of King v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994)). 
42. Thus, Petitioner's contention, that the Board erred because it considered 
Petitioner's commission of the instant offense to the exclusion of other factors for discretionary 
release to parole supervision and that the Board failed to acknowledge in its decision Petitioner's 
accomplishments regarding her institutional record, lacks merit. See Transcript at 12: 13-18. 
43. The Board decided that Petitioner's release "would be incompatible with the 
welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect 
for the law." Transcript at 12:8-12. Petitioner argues that the board's decision was conclusory 
because it failed to evaluate Petitioner's rehabilitative efforts and explain why her release would 
be incompatible with the welfare of society. 
44. First, as discussed above, the Board clearly took into account Petitioner's 
participation in rehabilitative programs, and it was Petitioner who declined to go into further 
12 
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detail. bel ieving that her submiss ions were .. self-explanatory." In addition. Petitioner's argument 
that the Board c.lid not provide her a complete parole interview when it a ll egedly refused to let 
her read her personal statement (Pet. a t p. 43) is fallacious. When· given an opportunity to relay 
the mean ing of the letter in her own words rather than reading them off of the page. Petitioner 
stated: 
Al the time of my crime I was mentally ill . ma'am. and throughout the years I 
have worked very hard to try and understand why and how I could commit such 
an act. During my rehabilitation. l have done MICA programs. l have taken one-
on-one the rapy over ten years, ma ' am. l have worked on and 
the crime itself is never going to change, but I have. l have changed. 
Transcript at 8:4-10. Petitioner' s statement wholly fa ils to show any insight or remorse into her 
crime, and therefore the argument that, by asking her to paraphrase he r personal statement, the 
Board fai led to grant her a complete interview, or failed to properly assess her insight and 
remorse, is unavailing. 
45. Petitioner also claims that the Board's decision that her re lease would be 
incompatible with the welfare of society was irrational because it did not define "which 
society or New York." Pet at p. 20. Any argument that the Board should only be 
concerned with the safety of New Yorkers is nonsensical. 
46. Moreover, contrary Lo Pe titioner's contention, the Board' s decis ion was 
sufficiently detailed to inform Petitioner o f the reasons for the denial of parole. See Transcript 
12:6-13:7. Accordingly, it satisfied the criteria set forth in Executive Law § 259-i. See Matter of 
Siao-Pao v Dennison, 11 N.Y.3d 777 (2008) (holding that "[t)he Board's written determination, 
while less than detailed than it might be, is not merely "conclusory" and so does not violate the 
law); Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 20 l A.D.2d 825 (3d Dep' t. I 993). 
13 
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8. Petitioner's Own Opinion about Herself is Immaterial for Parole Release 
Essentially, the premise of Petitioner's is that, was a 
candidate release, the Board's decision to deny her release had to been on 
their failure to consider all of the statutory factors. 
48. Petitioner's own speculative belief that she is an ideal candidate for that 
she will not violate the law upon release, and that her release will not pose a threat to the safety 
and well-being of the community, does not override the determination and discretion of the 
Board. 
49. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c) expressly provides that discretionary release on 
parole will not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined. Discretionary release to parole is only warranted after considering and weighing 
each of the relevant statutory factors. See Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
276 A.D.2d 899, 900 (3d Dep't. 2000); Matter of Larrier v. New York State Bd. of Parole 
Appeals Unit, 283 A.D.2d 700 (3d Dep 't 2001 ); Matter of Vasquez v. State of New York 
Executive Department Division of Parole, 20 A.D.3d 668 (3d Dep't. 2005); Matter of Wellman 
v. Dennison, 23 A.D.3d 974 (3d Dep't. 2005); Matter of Walker, 252 A.D.2d at 360. 
50. Petitioner's achievements while in prison, regardless of how significant she believes 
they are, do not automatically entitle her to parole release. See Matter of Faison v. Travis, 260 
A.D.2d 866 (3d Dep't 1999); Matter of Pulliam v Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 963 (3d Dep't 2007). The 
Board's determination that the inmate's achievements are outweighed by the severity of the 
crime is properly within the Board's discretion. See Matter of Santos v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1059, 
916 N.Y.S.2d 325 (3d Dep't. 2011); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385 (2d Dep't. 
14 
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17 A.D.3d 30 t ( l st Dep't. 
,~=~~=~,41 D.3dat 17. 
I. In ==~~~~~==~~:c==, 119 A.D.3d l (3d Dep't 14), 
the petitioner was a 
violent nature of his 
prison record. However, because of the 
murder, the court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding 
that "[ o ]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in accordance with the 
requirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject to further judicial review unless it is 
affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety . . . We emphasize that this Court has 
repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing denials of parole to 
petitioners whom we recognized as having exemplary records and as being compelling 
candidates for release." Id. at 1272 ( citing cases). 
52. The court further stated "[i]n short, the statutory language of Executive Law § 
259-i (5) dictating our limited power of review and the interpretation of that language by the 
Court of Appeals remain unchanged. Accordingly, inasmuch as the Board has not violated the 
statutory mandates and its determination does not exhibit irrationality bordering on impropriety 
under either our precedent or that of the Court of Appeals, its discretion is absolute and beyond 
review in the courts." Id. at 1275 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
C. Petitioner's Arguments Regarding the COMP AS are Unavailing 
53. Petitioner claims that there is erroneous information in her COMPAS, and that the 
Board therefore relied on incorrect information in making its decision. Pet. at p. 46. However, 
this argument is meritless. 
15 
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Petitioner, through counsel, her COMP AS on April 20 I before the 
at p. Petitioner failed to any issues of alleged errors in her 
at the interview. Therefore, as discussed above, she waived this objection. 
Notwithstanding the above, the claimed errors in the COMPAS, namely, stating 
that Petitioner's "Prison Release Status" was '·Max out" and categorizing "History of Violence" 
as a "Crimogenic Need" are immaterial. The Board clearly was aware that Petitioner was 
eligible for parole. Thus, any error in the "Prison Release Status" field of the COMP AS is de 
The argument regarding DOCCS' organization of the COMPAS is similarly 
unavailing. The fact that DOCCS places "History of Violence" under "Crimogenic Need" had 
no impact because, as the Board recognized during the interview, the COMPAS still reflected 
that Petitioner had a low chance of reoffending. See COMP AS, attached as Exh. G; Transcript 
at 3: 1 16. 
56. Petitioner also argues that the Board's decision should be vacated because the low 
risk scores under the CO MP AS contradict the Board's articulation of the statutory rationale in 
support of its decision. Pet. at p. I 9. However, similar to the other documents and information 
the Board considers under section 259-i(2)(c)(A) of the Executive Law, the Board may place 
whatever weight that it deems appropriate to the information derived from a scored COMP AS 
Re-Entry Risk Assessment when making its release decision. See Matter of Montane v. Evans, 
116 A.D.3d 197 (3d Dep't. 2014) (leave to appeal granted 23 N.Y.3d 903 (2014)); Rivera v. 
N.Y. Div., 119 A.D.3d 1107 (3d Dep't 2014); Matter of Garfield v. Evans, 108 A.D.3d 830 (3d 
Dep't. 2013). The COMPAS does not abrogate or diminish the Board's obligation to consider 
and weigh all of the statutory factors and render a decision under the governing standard set forth 
in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). Accordingly, Petitioner's argument is meritless. 
16 
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I>. The Hoard's Decision Was Made In Accordance with The Law, and The Record 
Does Not Show that The Hoard Failed to Consider Any Relevant Information 
is no merit to that the Board failed to her pre-
hearing parole submissions (Pet. at pp. l ), her written "personal statement" (Id. at p. 4 3 ), 
statements submitted by representatives of the victim (Id. at pp. 
recommendations regarding deportation (ld. at p. 36). 
to have professionally discharged its responsibilities. 
explained above, 
or DOCCS' 
Board is presumed 
529 U.S. at 244. Absent a convincing showing to the contrary, there 1s a 
presumption that the Board has acted properly in following the statutory requirements. See 
Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 476. 
58. The interview record clearly shows that the Board considered Petitioner's 
submissions. Transcript at 2: 17-20. Further, the Board stated that it had considered all of the 
statutory factors, including the nature of the offense, Petitioner's rehabilitative efforts while 
incarcerated, disciplinary infractions, program participation, her risks to society, and her plans 
for release. Id. at 12:14-18, 13:1-3. Thus, Petitioner's argument is unavailing. 
E. The Fact that the Hoard Did Not Consider the Sentencing Minutes Did Not Render 
Its Decision Irrational to the Point of Impropriety 
59. Petitioner argues that the Board improperly failed to consider the sentencing 
minutes from the Supreme Court, New York County. 
60. During the interview, the Board informed Petitioner that it had requested the 
sentencing minutes, but did not receive them, and therefore they could not be considered. 
Transcript at 3:4-8. The Board stated that it had an affidavit from the senior court reporter 









sentencing court, and 
minutes were not 
not render its decision irrational to the 
point of impropriety. ~=~~~~=~~~=~~.==, 70 A.D.3d 1106 (3d Dept. 
IO);==~~=~~~~~=~~~~=' 68 A.D.3d 1339 (3d Dept. 2009); 
62. Petitioner claims that she obtained a copy of the sentencing minutes, except for a 
missing 
interview. 
from DOCCS on April 20, as part of its information request prior to the 
Pet. at p. 44. The Board relied on the sentencing court's affidavit regarding the 
availability of the minutes. Transcript at 3:5-8. The Board also stated to Petitioner that "You 
were there at the time of sentencing, so if there's anything that was said that you think would be 
important for us to know, you can let us know during the interview." Id. at 3:9-11. Petitioner 
replied "Yes, ma'am." Id. at 3:12. However, Petitioner did not challenge the Board's statement 
that the sentencing minutes were unavailable, inform the Court that she had a copy of the 
sentencing minutes (with a missing page), or otherwise discuss the sentencing proceedings, at the 
interview. Therefore, she has waived the argument. 
63. Even if this argument has not been waived, the Board's failure to consider the 
sentencing minutes amounted to harmless error. The Board is required to consider "the 
seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and 
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the 
pre-sentence probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, 
and activities following arrest prior to confinement." Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vi). There 







3d 1039 (2d Dept. 2010). 
the fact that the did not consider the 
on the 2011 affidavit from the New York 
F. The Law Prevents Petitioner From Obtaining Confidential Information 
64. Petitioner argues that the Board unlawfully withheld documents or portions of 
documents from her. Pet at 45. As an initial matter, there is no indication that Petitioner 
challenged the alleged withholding of such records. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(d). Thus, 
Petitioner has not exhausted her administrative remedies with regard to the withholding of any 
records, and the issue is not justiciable. 
65. Nevertheless, Petitioner's arguments regarding undisclosed information lack 
merit. Any undisclosed information was based upon legitimate reasons, including, but not 
limited to, confidential information based upon evaluative opinions by staff, and information in 
the presentence investigative report that may not be disclosed without court order. 
66. Petitioner's contention that the redacted information from the COMPAS should 
have been made available to her (Pet. at p. 45) is unavailing. Such information concerns intra-
agency materials containing evaluative opinions by staff in connection with the preparation of 
the COMPAS for the Board's review. Therefore, the information was legitimately withheld 
from disclosure to Petitioner. See Public Officers Law §87(2)(g). 
67. The confidential information expresses the author's op1mon regarding the 
appropriateness of the Petitioner's possible release, which 1s evaluative in nature. Such 
3 The missing page at least partly includes a statement by Petitioner. See Pet. Exh. 25 at 7:25. 
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A.D.2d I (3d Dep't 
11 A.D.3d 
A.D.2d 781 (3d Dep't. 1997). 
68. Any similar evaluations or assessments by parole including page 
two of the Parole Board report or a DOCCS recommendation regarding her deportation, would 
be exempt from disclosure for the same reason. The fact that the Parole Board would consider 
such information prior to rendering its decision does not constitute sufficient reason, i.e. good 
cause, to release them. See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8000.5(c)(2)(i). 
69. Petitioner's claim that she was allegedly unlawfully deprived of having access to 
the Office of Mental Health report (Pet. at p. 45) is also meritless. Petitioner did not request 
mental health documents prior to her interview. Pet. Exh. 24; see also Mental Health 
Hygiene Law § 33.16 (regarding access to mental health clinical records). Moreover, as 
discussed above, any documents from the Office of Mental Health would contain clinical 
information which is diagnostic in nature and exempt from disclosure. 
THIRD OBJECTION IN POINT OF LAW 
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO DIRECT RELEASE TO PAROLE 
SUPERVISION 
70. Petitioner requests that the Court vacate the determination of the Board, and order 
Petitioner's immediate release, or, in the alternative, a de novo interview. See Notice of Petition. 
However, Petitioner may not obtain direct release to parole supervision in this proceeding. 
71. It is well settled that the appropriate remedy in an Article 78 proceeding 
challenging the denial of parole is a remand to the Board for a new interview. See Matter of Ifill 
v. Evans, 87 A.D.3d 776, 777 (3d Dept. 2011) ("the appropriate remedy for a successful 
20 
FUSL000027 
to a parole 
new 
A.D.2d 
Ct., Richmond Cty. Aug. 
determination is annulment of that determination and remand for a 
A.D.2d 837, 838 (3d Dept. 2011); 
A.D.2d 266, 266 (l st Dept. 1996); Matter 
A.D.2d 944, 944-45 (4th Dept 1994); ==~==~~=, 
1989) ("Any deprivation to the petitioner's due process rights are 
limited to a new hearing and upon such cure, he is not entitled to any further relief"). Indeed, the 
courts have acknowledged that the Executive Law gives the Board "sole discretionary powers to 
review an inmate's eligibility for release." Matter of Canales v. Hammock, 105 Misc. 2d 71, 75 
(Sup. Ct, Richmond Cty. Aug. 28, 1980). Thus, when courts have been confronted with flawed 
parole release interviews, they have not released inmates but rather ordered that new interviews 
be conducted. People ex rel. Haderxhanji v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 
368 (1st Dep't 1983) (denying habeas petition brought to challenge improper parole interview on 
the ground that the petitioner was entitled only to a new interview and not to release). 
72. Consequently, under the well-established law, the only authorized relief, even if 





WHEREFORE, Respondents respectfully request that the court grant the following 
(a) a judgment confirming Respondents' determination and dismissing the Petition; 
(b) and for such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 
Dated: New York, NY 
February 10, 2016 
22 
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN 
Attorney General of the 
State of New York 
Attorney for the Respondents 
By: 
Ya Fu 
As i~tant Attorney General 
12 Broadway - 24th Floor 
New York, New York 10271 
(212) 416-8582 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK COUNTY 
-------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- :x: 
In the Matter o f 
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For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 or the 
Civil Practice Law and Rules, 
- against -
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION; 
ANTHONY J. ANN UCCI, ACTING COMMISSIONER; 
and TINA M. STANFORD, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE 






YAN FU, ESQ., an attorney admitted to practice before the courts or the State of New 
York, affirms and states as fo llows: 
I am an Assistant Attorney General in the Office of ERIC T. SCH EIDERM/\.N, 
Anomey General of the State of New York, attorney for Respondents in the above-captioned 
proceeding. I have read the annexed answer, know the contents thereoC and state that the same 
are true to my knowledge, except for those matters alleged to be upon information and belief: 
and as to those matters I believe them to be true. 
Executed February 10, 2016 
